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ACROSS THE BORDER AND BACK AGAIN:
IMMIGRATION STATUS AND THE ARTICLE 12
“WELL-SETTLED” DEFENSE
Michael Singer*
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction is a multilateral international treaty designed to effectively
govern the return of children abducted (often by a parent) and taken to a
foreign country. In most cases, if the “left-behind” parent applies for relief
under the Convention within a year of the abduction, the child must be
returned to the country of origin for a custody hearing. If, however, the
application for return is made more than one year after abduction and the
child is now “well-settled” in their new environment, the application may
be denied under the well-settled affirmative defense provided by Article 12
of the Convention. The Convention does not, however, specify which
factors are to be considered in a well-settled determination, and courts
have frequently grappled with how immigration status (particularly,
whether the abducting parent and child are living in the new country
illegally) should impact the determination. U.S. and international courts
have adopted one of three approaches to the issue: granting immigration
status considerable weight in the determination, treating immigration status
as one of a number of equally weighted factors in the determination, or
granting immigration status considerably little weight in the determination.
This Note addresses this conflict and concludes that courts should generally
accord immigration status little weight, except where uncertain
immigration status is likely to affect the child’s future prospects,
irrespective of a deportation risk.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2004, Diana Lucia Montoya Alvarez and Manuel Jose Lozano, both
British citizens originally from Colombia, met in London and began
dating.1 Though they never married, Diana eventually gave birth to a baby
girl on October 21, 2005.2 Shortly thereafter, things took a turn for the
worse. Diana claimed that Manuel had frequently abused her, calling her
names and attempting to rape her.3 Their child, exposed to these domestic
disputes, developed a host of problems, including frequent and spontaneous
fits of crying, nightmares, and bed-wetting.4 Nonetheless, Manuel
submitted that the three maintained a relatively normal family life.5
On November 19, 2008, Diana and her daughter set out for nursery
school but never returned.6 Instead, they hid out at a women’s shelter for
nearly seven months before arranging for a clandestine trip across the
Atlantic Ocean.7 In New York City, the two rendezvoused with Diana’s
sister, a U.S. citizen with a family of her own.8 Finally, Diana and her
daughter were safe from her husband.
Manuel, however, had other ideas. Still believing his family could
reconcile their differences, he pursued every available means to locate his
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2012).
Id. at 45–46.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 46.
Id.
Id.
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daughter in the United Kingdom before learning that she was now living in
New York.9 Desperate to reunite with her, he filed a petition for the child’s
return under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction (the Convention).10 Manuel claims that the child should
be returned to the United Kingdom.11 Diana claims the child now has an
established life in New York.12 The battle lines are drawn, but which party
should prevail? Should the fact that Diana and her daughter are living in
New York illegally impact the court’s decision? This Note will attempt to
answer this difficult question.
As the Ninth Circuit has stated, “It is never an easy nor a joyous task to
resolve a dispute between parents that may determine the custody of their
child; nor is the outcome ever fully satisfactory. Frequently, both sides
offer appealing, indeed compelling, arguments.
Yet, both cannot
prevail.”13 Custody battles are inherently emotionally charged disputes,
and they are made all the more complex when they cross international lines.
Indeed, situations such as the one described above are not uncommon and
have far-reaching, significant effects. The court’s determination of whether
the child may retain residence in a new country is far more complex than a
common domestic custody dispute. The situation becomes even more
muddled when, as is frequently the case, the fleeing parent and child are in
the new country illegally.
Fortunately, over eighty nations (including the United States) have
implemented a treaty intended to provide a framework for remedying these
difficult scenarios.14 The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction is an international treaty with the goal of
“protect[ing] children from the harmful effects of abduction and retention
across international boundaries by providing a procedure to bring about
their prompt return.”15 Convened in 1980 at The Hague, the Convention
deals exclusively with unilateral, wrongful removal of children by parents,
guardians, or close family members.16 The issue of international child
abduction is significant. In the one-year period between October 1, 2006,

9. Id. at 47.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 47–48.
12. See In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d 197, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
13. In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 2009).
14. Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, Status Table, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., http://www.hcch.net/
index_en.php?act=conventions.statusprint&cid=24 (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) [hereinafter
Status Table]. These eighty nations include both Convention members and nonmembers. Id.
15. Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, Child Abduction Section, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L.,
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=21 (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
16. PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. MCELEAVY, THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 1, 4 (1999).

3696

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

and September 30, 2007, 355 applications for the return of 518 children
were submitted to the U.S. Central Authority alone.17
Though the Convention aims to provide for the swift return of abducted
children, it does grant a number of affirmative defenses that may be
asserted by the abducting parent to counter the return application. One such
affirmative defense is Article 12, the “well-settled” defense.18 Article 12
states that a child shall be returned to the petitioning parent if the petition is
filed within a year of the child’s abduction.19 If, however, the abducting
parent can establish that the petitioning parent has applied for relief under
the Convention more than a year after abduction and the child is now wellsettled in their new environment, the child may be allowed to remain in the
new country.20 The Convention does not, however, specify how this wellsettled determination is to be made or what factors may be considered.21
Additionally, the Convention offers no guidance on how immigration status
should be treated in the well-settled determination.22
Both U.S. and international courts have adopted a variety of approaches
in determining the proper weight to be accorded to immigration status in the
well-settled determination. Some courts have granted immigration status
considerable weight in finding the child not to be well-settled, holding that
uncertain immigration status significantly undermines an otherwise wellsettled finding.23 Other courts have considered it as one of a number of
Further, some courts have accorded
equally weighted factors.24
immigration status significantly less weight, finding the child to be settled
despite an uncertain immigration status.25 This conflict also implicates a
broader issue: Should courts take the child’s future prospects into account
in making the well-settled determination?26 This Note will examine these
two issues.
17. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON
CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 5 (April 2008), available at
http://travel.state.gov/pdf/2008HagueAbductionConventionComplianceReport.pdf.
Each
signatory is required to designate a Central Authority “to discharge the duties which are
imposed by the Convention.” Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction art. 6, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
18. Hague Convention, supra note 17, art. 12.
19. Id. (“Where . . . a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the
wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child
forthwith.”).
20. Id. (“The judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been
commenced after the expiration of the period of one year . . . shall also order the return of the
child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment.”).
21. See, e.g., In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 1003 (9th Cir. 2009).
22. See, e.g., id. at 1001–02.
23. See, e.g., In re Koc, 181 F. Supp. 2d 136, 154 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
24. See, e.g., Giampaolo v. Erneta, 390 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1281–82 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
25. See, e.g., Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2012).
26. For example, some courts have rejected a “well-settled” finding on the basis that
immigration status significantly limits a child’s future prospects. See, e.g., A. v. M. (2002),
209 N.S.R. 2d 248, paras. 85–87 (Can. N.S. C.A.). Other courts have held that the
determination should only consider the child’s current situation and should not entail
speculation about the child’s future. See, e.g., Dir.-Gen., Dep’t of Cmty. Servs. v M (1998)
THE
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Part I of this Note provides the context for this discussion. Specifically,
it considers the background of the Convention, U.S. implementation of the
Convention, the procedure for the child’s return, and jurisdictional issues.
Part I also discusses a typical Convention case, the specifics of Article 12,
considerations regarding the timing of the well-settled determination, the
standard of review and treaty interpretation process, and relevant U.S.
immigration classifications. Part II discusses the various approaches courts
have taken in considering immigration status as a factor in the well-settled
determination. Part II specifically considers three different ways courts
have considered the issue: as a significant factor, as an equally weighted
factor, and as a relatively insignificant factor. Part II also discusses how
this conflict interacts with the broader question of whether (and to what
degree) the determination should take a child’s future prospects into
account. Part III proposes that the U.S. Supreme Court consider the issue
and promulgate a bright-line rule that immigration status should, by default,
be accorded relatively minimal weight in the determination. It also argues,
however, that courts should consider a child’s likely future prospects in
both their country of origin and country of current residence on a case-bycase basis.
I. THE CONVENTION, ARTICLE 12, AND IMMIGRATION ISSUES
Part I.A provides background information on the Convention, while Part
I.B addresses U.S. implementation of the Convention. Part I.C highlights
the standard procedure for the return of an abducted child, Part I.D
discusses a host of jurisdictional issues associated with the Convention
process, and Part I.E provides an example of a typical Convention case.
Part I.F surveys Article 12 in detail, while Part I.G considers various issues
surrounding the timing of the well-settled determination. Part I.H addresses
the standard of review embraced in Convention cases and how the treaty
interpretation process is generally conducted. Lastly, Part I.I notes various
U.S. immigration classifications relevant to Article 12 cases.
A. Hague Convention Background
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction is an international treaty signed at The Hague on October 25,
1980.27 The Convention was specifically crafted to respond to the growing
problem of international child abductions—spurred by increased global
mobility, sociolegal and technical developments, and breakdowns in the

24 Fam LR 178 ¶ 91 (Austl.). Still, other courts have found that immigration status will
have a minimal impact on a child’s future prospects in finding the child to be well-settled.
See, e.g., B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1013.
27. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 16, at 23.
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traditional family structure.28 Prior to its signing, the recovery of an
abducted child was exceedingly difficult.29
Hague Conventions each follow a relatively similar pattern. Once a topic
is chosen, the first step is to investigate the issue and determine if there
exists a collective will to address it.30 The topic is then formally adopted by
the Conference in Plenary Session, and the Permanent Bureau conducts
further research.31 Once these steps are complete, the negotiation and
drafting process can begin.32
The origins of the Convention at issue in this Note can be traced to a
meeting of the Special Commission of Miscellaneous Matters in January
1976.33 At that meeting, a Canadian delegate suggested that the topic of
“legal kidnapping” be added to the agenda.34 In the years that followed, the
Permanent Bureau began to research the subject, an inquiry that considered
both the legal and sociological aspects of the issue.35 Initially, the findings
of the report generated little support for an international tribunal on the
issue; there was, however, a call for increased international cooperation.36
A Special Commission was convened to iron out the details of the first
Convention draft, and eventually the draft was presented to Convention
members for comments.37 In the days that followed, the affirmative
defenses against automatic return of the child—one of which was Article
Eventually, however, a
12—generated the most intense debate.38
compromise was reached, and the first four signatories—Canada, France,
Greece, and Switzerland—signed the Convention on October 25, 1980.39
The Convention has since been implemented by over eighty signatories,
including the United States.40 Though the drafters of the Convention
originally intended to provide protection for mothers from abusive, childabducting fathers, the vast majority of Convention cases to date have
actually involved mothers who have abducted their children.41
28. Id. at 2.
29. See id. at 3. Prior to the Convention, the process for locating and returning the child
was exceedingly complicated and inefficient. First, the child needed to be located. The
court then would often engage in a lengthy proceeding—usually treating the abduction as a
“legal kidnapping”—before ultimately determining whether return was warranted. See id.
30. See id. at 16.
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 16–17.
34. Id. at 17.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 18.
37. Id. at 18–19.
38. Id. at 19.
39. Id. at 23.
40. Status Table, supra note 14. The United States has implemented the Convention
through the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11611
(2006).
41. See Merle H. Weiner, International Child Abduction and the Escape from Domestic
Violence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 593, 609–10 (2000). Indeed, a 2003 report found that 68
percent of abducting parents were mothers. See Nigel Lowe, A Statistical Analysis of
Applications Made in 2003 Under the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil
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The primary objective of the Convention is to “protect children
internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or
retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the
State of their habitual residence, as well as to secure protection for rights of
access.”42 The Convention specifically aims to restore the preabduction
status quo and to deter parents from crossing international borders in the
hope of securing a more sympathetic custody-dispute forum.43 Indeed, the
Perez-Vera report, an explanatory report accompanying the Convention,
explains that the Convention aims to achieve deterrence by reestablishing
the status quo, and allowing the court of habitual residence to make a
custody determination.44 The Convention’s focus is ultimately whether the
child “should be returned to a country for custody proceedings and not what
the outcome of those proceedings should be.”45
B. U.S. Implementation of the Convention
The United States implemented the Convention through the International
Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA).46 Ratified in 1988,47 ICARA
codifies the Convention’s various articles, “establish[ing] legal rights and
procedures for the prompt return of children who have been wrongfully
removed or retained.”48 ICARA lays out the prima facie case for wrongful
retention. In order to secure return of the child, the “left-behind” parent
must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the habitual
residence49 of the child immediately before the date of the alleged wrongful
retention was indeed in a foreign country; (2) the retention is in breach of
custody rights under the original country’s law; and (3) the petitioner was
exercising custody rights at the time of the alleged wrongful retention.50 If
the petitioner can satisfy this burden, and has made his application within
one year from the child’s abduction, the child must be returned unless an
affirmative defense can be established.51

Aspects of International Child Abduction, HCCH, 21–22 (Sept. 2008),
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/abd_pd03e1_2007.pdf.
42. Hague Convention, supra note 17, pmbl.
43. In re Ahumada Cabrera, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (citing Lops v.
Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 936 (11th Cir. 1998)).
44. See Elisa Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report on the 1980 Hague Child Abduction
Convention, HCCH, 429 (1982), http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl28.pdf.
45. Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis omitted).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11611 (2006).
47. Id.
48. Id. § 11601(a); see also Edoho v. Edoho, No. H-10-1881, 2010 WL 3257480, at *4
(S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2010).
49. “Habitual residence” has been defined as the “place where [the child] has been
physically present for an amount of time sufficient for acclimatization and which has a
degree of settled purpose from the child’s perspective.” In re Ahumada Cabrera, 323 F.
Supp. 2d 1303, 1310–11 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (citing Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 224 (3d
Cir. 1995)).
50. See id. at 1310.
51. See id. at 1312.
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C. Procedure for the Return of the Child
The Convention process for securing the return of a child can be a
lengthy and intimidating endeavor, especially for a petitioner with a limited
grasp of English.52 Once an application has been completed, it is typically
submitted to the Central Authority of the country of the child’s habitual
residence.53 The application is then transmitted to the Central Authority of
the country where the applicant believes the child now lives.54 In the
United States, the application is then passed on to the National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), which investigates the child’s
whereabouts and transmits the application to the relevant state attorney
general.55 The petitioner may then file his petition in either state court or
the federal district court in the state where the child is currently living.56
D. Jurisdictional Issues
Under ICARA, both U.S. district and state courts are granted concurrent
original jurisdiction over petitions filed under the Convention.57 As a
result, judges with a wide range of experience and expertise hear
Convention cases.58 State and federal courts are theoretically supposed to
apply and interpret the Convention in the same way. Federal courts,
however, are generally more likely to interpret the Convention
appropriately but are often considered slower avenues of resolution.59 In
contrast, state courts may be more efficient in resolving family law and
custody issues but often misconstrue the Convention’s mandate by
considering the underlying merits of the custody action, rather than
returning the child to the country of habitual residence (in the event that the
well-settled defense proves unsuccessful) for a custody determination.60

52. See, e.g., In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 1006 (9th Cir. 2009). For example, in
B. Del C.S.B, the father petitioning for the return of his daughter to Mexico made numerous
trips to the Mexican Minors Protection Department, met with the Mexican State Department,
and eventually submitted an application under the Convention. Id. He was forced to wait
nearly seven months, however, while the application was translated into English. Id.
53. See, e.g., id.
54. See, e.g., id.
55. See, e.g., id.
56. See ICARA, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a) (2006) (“The courts of the States and the United
States district courts shall have concurrent original jurisdiction of actions arising under the
Convention.”); see also B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1006–07.
57. In re Koc, 181 F. Supp. 2d 136, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
58. Catherine Norris, Comment, Immigration and Abduction: The Relevance of U.S.
Immigration Status to Defenses Under the Hague Convention on International Child
Abduction, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 159, 167 n.58 (2010).
59. See id.
60. See id.
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E. A Typical Hague Convention Case
Some scholars have noted that “[a]bductions occur for a variety of
reasons from the narcissistic to the heroic.”61 Though they necessarily
vary, the vast majority of Convention cases involve mothers and children
fleeing due to domestic violence and the inability of their home country to
protect them.62 Other common reasons for abductions include the desire to
exact some sort of revenge on the left-behind parent, the desire to protect
the child from harm, and the desire of one parent to return to their country
of origin.63
The most common destination is the United States.64 Indeed, the United
States receives more petitions for the return of children than any other
signatory to the Convention.65 Since the late 1970s, the State Department
estimates that the United States has received inquiries for over 16,000 cases
of international child abduction.66
F. Article 12: The Well-Settled Defense
The Convention provides a number of affirmative defenses that may be
asserted by the abducting parent to prevent the return of the child to the
country of origin.67 One such defense is established in Article 12—the
well-settled defense.68 Article 12 specifically states that “[t]he judicial or
administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been
commenced after the expiration of the period of one year . . . shall also
order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now
settled in its new environment.”69 The defense is based on the rationale that
when a child has become settled and adjusted to a new environment, a

61. Geoffrey L. Greif & Rebecca L. Hegar, International Parental Abduction and Its
Implications for Social Work Practice: Great Britain to the United States, 7 CHILD. & SOC’Y
269, 270 (1993).
62. Norris, supra note 58, at 160.
63. See Greif & Hegar, supra note 61, at 270.
64. Lowe, supra note 41, at 33.
65. See id.
66. See Sudha Shetty & Jeffrey L. Edleson, Adult Domestic Violence in Cases of
International Parental Child Abduction, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 115, 118 (2005).
67. See In re Ahumada Cabrera, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2004). Courts
have been directed to construe these defenses narrowly. Id.
68. Other affirmative defenses that may be raised include (1) the parent seeking return of
the child consented to the child’s removal or retention, (2) the return of the child is not
permitted under fundamental principles of human rights, and (3) returning the child would
place the child at “grave risk” of harm. See id. Despite the existence of these affirmative
defenses, however, courts retain ultimate discretion in determining whether a child should be
returned to their country of habitual residence. See Hague Convention, supra note 17, art. 18.
Article 18 of the Convention states that the defenses “do not limit the power of a judicial or
administrative authority to order the return of the child at any time.” Id. Thus, courts retain
ultimate discretion in ordering the return of a child, despite the existence of an affirmative
defense, if return would further the aims of the Convention. See Ahumada Cabrera, 323 F.
Supp. 2d at 1310.
69. Hague Convention, supra note 17, art. 12.
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forced return might only serve to cause the child further distress,
accentuating the harm caused by the initial relocation.70
The Convention declined, however, to provide any specification as to
what constitutes well-settled, and courts have, in response, taken a variety
of approaches in interpreting the defense. It is largely agreed that the
definition should reflect the Convention’s intention of providing a swift
return of the child if possible, and to have custody matters decided in the
sovereign with the strongest interest in the child’s care and protection.71 At
least one court has viewed the definition as a two-pronged analysis
involving (1) the physical element of being established in a new community
and (2) an emotional and psychological element projecting stability into the
future.72 The U.S. State Department has declared that a “settled” finding is
appropriate where “nothing less than substantial evidence of the child’s
significant connections to the new country is intended to suffice to meet the
respondent’s burden of proof.”73 Courts have agreed, however, that this
burden must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.74
The list of factors frequently considered is a long one, and each case
dictates that different issues be addressed in the well-settled analysis.
Generally, however, courts commonly consider the age of the child, the
stability of the new residence, whether the child attends school or day care
consistently, whether the child attends a religious institution regularly, the
stability of the abducting parent’s employment, and whether the child has
friends and relatives in the area.75 Courts will also less frequently consider
the child’s living environment, the involvement of the child’s parents, any
active measures taken to conceal the child’s whereabouts,76 and the
possibility of prosecution for concealing the child.77 Questions of
immigration status do not often arise in a court’s adjudication of the casein-chief, often because most judges find it irrelevant to the question of
whether a wrongful removal occurred.78 Courts have found immigration

70. In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 1002–03 (9th Cir. 2009).
71. See In re Koc, 181 F. Supp. 2d 136, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); see also In re Robinson,
983 F. Supp. 1339, 1344–45 (D. Colo. 1997).
72. C (a Child), [2006] EWHC (Fam) 1229, [46] (Eng.).
73. Text & Legal Analysis of Hague International Child Abduction Convention, 51 Fed.
Reg. 10,494, 10,509 (Mar. 26, 1986).
74. In re Ahumada Cabrera, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
75. Id. at 1314; Anderson v. Acree, 250 F. Supp. 2d 876, 881 (S.D. Ohio 2002); see also
Wojcik v. Wojcik, 959 F. Supp. 413, 421 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
76. Concealment of the child is a frequent occurrence and has provided no shortage of
trouble for courts interpreting Article 12. Specifically, this issue has given rise to another
hotly contested and timely debate that is ultimately beyond the scope of this Note: May the
one year period for return of the child be tolled where the child’s whereabouts have been
concealed by the abducting parent? Both domestic and international courts have interpreted
the tolling issue differently, and it frequently accompanies the immigration status debate that
this Note addresses. For a detailed discussion of the tolling issue, see Merle H. Weiner,
Uprooting Children in the Name of Equity, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 409 (2010).
77. Ahumada Cabrera, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1314.
78. Norris, supra note 58, at 169.
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status relevant, however, in determining if the “grave-risk”79 and wellsettled defenses apply.80 Thus, immigration status, when relevant, is
considered in the well-settled determination as well.
G. Timing of Article 12 Well-Settled Determinations and
Consideration of Future Prospects
In considering how the well-settled determination should be made, courts
have taken a variety of approaches concerning the timing of the
determination and whether the determination should ultimately consider the
child’s likely future prospects in the new country. How courts approach
this issue significantly affects whether, and to what degree, the court
considers immigration status to be a relevant factor. Some courts have held
that “[t]he test, and the only test to be applied, is whether the children have
settled in their new environment. That test is to be applied either at the time
of the application being made or at the time of trial.”81 Advocates of such
an approach point to the Convention’s focus on the present, and contend
that the Convention does not have an interest in determining the best
interests of the child in the long term.82 In such instances, the
determination of future well-being is better suited for the court conducting
the ultimate custody proceeding.83
Many courts have adopted the opposite approach, holding instead that the
well-settled determination should consider a child’s future prospects.84
Courts in favor of such an approach often weigh whether there appears to
be an immediate threat of deportation,85 and whether, on a case-by-case
basis, children will be able to take full advantage of opportunities available
to them.86 Indeed, this approach cuts both ways. In some instances, courts
may find the lack of opportunities for undocumented immigrants to be a
significant factor in the consideration of how immigration status affects the
well-settled determination.87 In others, courts have found that the

79. See supra note 68.
80. Id.
81. Dir.-Gen., Dep’t of Cmty. Servs. v M, (1998) 24 Fam LR 178 ¶ 91 (Austl.).
82. In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 1013 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The Convention . . . is
concerned with the present, and not with determining the best interests of the child in the
long term.”); see also Matovski v. Matovski, No. 06 Civ. 4259 (PKC), 2007 WL 2600862, at
*8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2007) (noting that Article 12 does not invite courts to decide “which
country offers a more comfortable material existence”).
83. See B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1013.
84. See, e.g., (A Child), [2006] EWHC (Fam) 1229, 2 Fam. 797 [55]–[57] (Eng.)
(stating that new residence must “be as permanent as anything in life could be said to be
permanent”).
85. See, e.g., id.
86. See, e.g., Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 57 (2d Cir. 2012).
87. See, e.g., A. v. M. (2002), 209 N.S.R. 2d 248, paras. 85–87 (Can. N.S. C.A.) (finding
that a mother’s uncertain immigration status and potential inability to work were relevant to
the “well-settled” determination).
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protections afforded to undocumented immigrants weigh in favor of a
finding that the child is well-settled.88
H. Standard of Review/Treaty Interpretation Process
The process by which courts engage in treaty interpretation is essential to
the court’s ultimate determination of whether, and to what degree,
immigration status should be considered in an Article 12 analysis. Courts
often begin the treaty interpretation process by considering the text of the
treaty and the context in which it is used.89 The clear meaning of the treaty
language controls, unless that interpretation is inconsistent with the
intentions of the drafters.90 Courts may employ rules of statutory
construction in interpreting ambiguous passages but may also consider the
history of the treaty and the way various signatories have interpreted a
particular provision.91
Likewise, the standard of review embraced by appellate courts engaging
in an Article 12 analysis plays a key role in how courts consider the various
inquiries associated with a well-settled analysis. Indeed, there is some
confusion over the standard of review to be applied in interpreting Article
12. Generally, courts have held that the factual findings underlying an
Article 12 determination are reviewed for clear error, but the ultimate legal
conclusion of whether a child is settled or not is reviewed de novo.92
Factual findings that are reviewed for clear error include whether the factors
often considered in the well-settled determination are present in a particular
case.93 Whether these various factors are relevant to determining if the
child is well-settled, however, is subject to de novo review.94 For example,
whether a child and mother are living in a country illegally is reviewed for
clear error, but whether this factor is considered in finding the child to be
well-settled or not is reviewed de novo.95 This second issue—whether, and
to what degree, immigration status should be considered in the
determination—is the main focus of this Note.
I. Immigration Classifications
The distinction between immigration classifications is inherently relevant
to the determination of whether a parent or child is living in the United
States illegally. Three broad categories of immigration classifications exist.
The first is permanent resident aliens, commonly referred to as
88. See B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1013. Such protections include the right to public
education irrespective of immigration status, as well as a variety of public services available
to undocumented immigrants including emergency Medicaid, school breakfast and lunch
programs, and access to state nutritional programs. Id.
89. See Lozano, 697 F.3d at 50.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1008; see also Lozano, 697 F.3d at 49–50.
93. See B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1008.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 1009–10; see also Lozano, 697 F.3d at 49–50.
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immigrants.96 These residents have been admitted to the United States as
lawful permanent residents.97 The second class, temporary residents (or
nonimmigrants), consists of aliens admitted to the United States for a
specific purpose, such as diplomats or students.98 The last relevant class,
commonly referred to as “EWIs” (entered without inspection) or
undocumented workers, is made up of undocumented aliens living within
the United States.99 Most of the parties in Convention cases fall into this
third category.100
II. THE IMMIGRATION STATUS DEBATE: THREE APPROACHES
“To be sure, like all persons who have entered the United States
unlawfully . . . children are subject to deportation. But there is no
assurance that a child subject to deportation will ever be deported. An
illegal entrant might be granted federal permission to continue to reside in
this country, or even to become a citizen. In light of the discretionary
federal power to grant relief from deportation, a State cannot realistically
determine that any particular undocumented child will in fact be deported
. . . .”101

This uncertainty lies at the heart of the debate addressed by this Note.
Indeed, the weight to be accorded to immigration status in the well-settled
determination is significantly impacted by the likelihood that the child will
be deported (among other factors).102 Although courts have consistently
found immigration status to be a factor in the well-settled determination to
date, no court has held it to be singularly dispositive.103 Further, while
district courts have often taken a child’s immigration status into account
when deciding if the child is well-settled, until recently, only one federal
appellate court—the Ninth Circuit—had directly addressed “whether a court
may find that a child is not ‘settled’ for the purposes of Article 12 of the

96. See Glossary of Terms, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgn
extoid=5bb767ee5cb38210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=5bb767ee5cb
38210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
97. See id.
98. See id. Other common examples of temporary residents include foreign government
officials, visitors for business or pleasure, aliens in transit through the U.S., international
representatives, temporary workers and trainees, representatives of foreign media, exchange
visitors, immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, intracompany transferees, NATO officials, and
religious workers. Id.
99. See Guevara v. Holder, 649 F.3d 1086, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2011) (defining an
undocumented alien as one who “entered without inspection”).
100. See, e.g., B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1004; In re Koc, 181 F. Supp. 2d 136, 140
(E.D.N.Y. 2001).
101. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 226 (1982) (citations omitted).
102. Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 57 (2d Cir. 2012). Other factors that are likely to
impact the importance of the child’s immigration status are the likelihood that the child will
be able to obtain legal status, the child’s age, and the extent to which the child may be
harmed by an inability to receive certain benefits. Id.
103. See id. at 57.
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Hague Convention for the reason that she does not have lawful immigration
status.”104
This part addresses the various approaches courts have taken in
determining whether, and to what degree, immigration status should impact
a finding that a child is well-settled. Specifically, Part II discusses the three
prevailing ways district, appellate, and international courts have interpreted
the immigration status issue as it relates to the well-settled determination:
as a significant, as equally weighted, and as relatively insignificant.
A. Immigration Status As a Heavily Weighted Factor
The first cases addressed in this part have held immigration status to be a
significant factor in the well-settled determination, often undermining a
child’s otherwise settled status. In re Ahumada Cabrera,105 decided by the
Southern District of Florida, is one such case. The respondent, Lozano, fled
with her child from her home in Argentina to Florida.106 Upon her arrival,
she told immigration officials that she and the child were simply visiting as
Not long after, however, the mother obtained illegal
tourists.107
employment in the United States and registered her child in a Florida
school.108 The petitioner, the child’s father, eventually learned that Lozano
and the child were living with Lozano’s sister in Florida, and initiated
Convention proceedings.109 In response, Lozano asserted that the child was
now settled in Florida.110
The court found that despite the existence of numerous factors indicating
that the mother and child had established significant ties to their new
environment—including that the child attended school regularly, had good
grades, and participated in extracurricular activities—the mother’s uncertain
immigration status undermined a finding that the child was now “wellsettled.”111 The court granted significant weight to a comparative
consideration of the child’s future prospects in both Florida and Argentina.
The court noted that the mother lacked long-term job stability in Florida,
104. B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1001–02.
105. 323 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
106. Id. at 1308. The Lozano in Ahumada Cabrera bears no apparent relation to the
Lozano in Lozano v. Alvarez.
107. Id. at 1309.
108. Id. at 1308.
109. Id. at 1309.
110. Id. at 1312.
111. Id. at 1314 (holding that “any stability [the child] may enjoy in the United States is
significantly undermined by the Respondent’s uncertain immigration status”). It is also
worth noting (though it is ultimately beyond the scope of this Note), that the court
additionally found that equitable tolling should apply in this scenario. Id. at 1313. The court
held that, despite the fact that the father had filed his petition more than a year after the
abduction, his petition was still timely (essentially rendering any application of the Article
12 defense moot). Id. The court thus found that the child’s return was warranted both under
the standard provisions of the Convention mandating return if the petition is filed within one
year of abduction, and because the well-settled defense was undermined by the mother’s
immigration status. Id. at 1314–15.
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and that the child faced no threat of deportation in her native country.112
Therefore, the court held that “it is better for the child to return to Argentina
now than for her to be deported at a later date when she has become firmly
settled in the United States.”113
The Eastern District of New York came to a similar conclusion in In re
Koc.114 In Koc, both the mother and father, though Polish, had resided in
Greece with their young child.115 The mother obtained a six-month visa,
and told the father she was taking the child to the United States to visit the
child’s grandparents; however, she never returned.116 Both mother and
child eventually established significant ties to their new country: the child
obtained medical insurance in the United States and received regular
medical and dental care, a number of the mother’s family members lived in
the neighboring area, and the mother had steady employment as a piano
teacher.117 An associate of the mother even testified that she would be
willing to sponsor the mother for a visa if the mother and child were
threatened with deportation.118
Despite the existence of these factors, however, the court found that the
child was not settled in her new environment due to the uncertain
immigration status of both the mother and child.119 The court noted that
“[t]he fact that the Immigration Service may not be looking to deport [the
mother and child] at this time does not, in any way, guarantee that that
position will not change in the future . . . .”120 Even though other members
of the mother’s family were legal citizens, and a friend was willing to
sponsor the mother, the court found that this did not significantly alter the
uncertainty of the child’s future prospects.121
The Middle District of Florida has adopted a similar view. In Lopez v.
Alcala,122 the court found immigration status to be a significant factor
undermining the well-settled determination.123 Lopez involved a mother
who fled with two of her children from Mexico to Texas, leaving the father
and another child behind.124 Though they entered the country illegally, the
mother was able to secure employment at a dry cleaner and enroll her

112. Id. at 1314.
113. Id.
114. 181 F. Supp. 2d 136 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
115. Id. at 140.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 143–44, 153–54.
118. Id. at 144.
119. Id. at 154. The court held that immigration status was one of a number of factors
weighing against a finding that the child was settled. Id. Specifically, the court noted that
the child had moved often since arriving in the United States and had developed few friends.
Id. Further, the mother had been unable to establish lasting and significant employment. Id.
120. Id. The child’s father had actually been denied a visa to visit his wife and daughter
in the United States because of their uncertain immigration status. Id.
121. Id. at 154 n.20.
122. 547 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (M.D. Fla. 2008).
123. Id. at 1260.
124. Id. at 1256–57.
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children in public school.125 Despite their EWI status, the mother and
children applied for petitions seeking asylum in the United States.126
In finding that the children were not well-settled in their new
environment, the court considered a number of factors, including
immigration status.127 The court stated that a vast number of factors
weighed in favor of finding that the children were settled: the children had
adjusted well to school, made a number of friends, and learned English.128
Yet, the court found that because the mother and children were illegal
aliens, they were subject to deportation at any time, and therefore could
never truly be settled in the United States.129 Additionally, the court held
that their applications for asylum status were irrelevant to the determination
because they had not yet been approved and appeared to lack merit.130
International courts have also addressed this inquiry, and have, in some
instances, adopted a similar approach to that embraced by the U.S. district
courts discussed above. A. v. M.,131 a case decided by the Nova Scotia
Court of Appeals, concerned an American mother and child who fled to
Canada.132 The mother and father were both American citizens and
residents of Iowa.133 They eventually divorced amid allegations of child
abuse; however, these allegations ultimately proved to be unfounded, and
the father was granted visitation rights with the child.134 The mother, in an
attempt to subvert the court’s grant of visitation rights, fled with the child to
Canada.135 The mother remarried and subsequently separated from a
Canadian man,136 and eventually settled with the child in a small town in
Nova Scotia.137 Meanwhile, a U.S. judge ordered the return of both mother
and child to Iowa.138
In determining whether the child was well-settled in Nova Scotia, the
court considered the significant connections established by the child in her
community and the duration of her residence there.139 The court noted,
however, that the child still had significant ties to Iowa—specifically, the
father’s family lived in Iowa and the various professionals involved in the
abuse allegations and custody proceedings were residents of Iowa.140 The
court ultimately held that ordering the child’s return would further the
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 1257.
Id.
Id. at 1260.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1260 n.6.
(2002), 209 N.S.R. 2d 248 (Can. N.S. C.A.).
Id. para. 1.
Id. para. 3.
Id. paras. 3–7.
Id. paras. 9–10.
Id. paras. 11–13.
Id. para. 14.
Id. para. 19.
See id. para. 79.
Id. para. 79.
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deterrent purpose of the Convention by preventing the mother from
subverting an Iowa court ruling.141 The court placed significant weight on
the child’s future stability, specifically noting that since the mother and
child were living in Canada illegally, their ability to remain there was, at
best, uncertain.142 Further, the mother’s uncertain immigration status was a
significant barrier to her ability to secure long-term employment.143
Therefore, the court held that the child was required to return to Iowa.144
Canadian courts are not the only foreign jurisdiction to have considered
the immigration status issue.
In Director-General, Department of
Community Services v M.,145 the Family Court of Australia was presented
with the opportunity to consider the role of immigration status in the wellsettled determination. The parents were married in Poland and their
children were Polish citizens.146 Amid allegations that the father had
abused the children, the mother sent both her son and daughter to live with
her mother in Australia.147 Eventually, the mother divorced the father, and,
upon establishing a more stable living situation, sent for the children from
Australia.148 Her mother (the children’s grandmother), however, refused to
return the children.149 Thereafter, the mother flew to Australia in an
attempt to reestablish contact with the children.150 At the time Director
General was decided, the grandmother had an order for interim residence of
the children, while the mother had an order for interim contact.151 Upon the
completion of the instant proceedings, the court would consider the pending
residence application.152
At the time the case was decided, the children held bridging visas that
allowed them to remain in the country temporarily, pending the outcome of
a petition for permanent residence filed by the grandmother.153 The court,
in making its determination, recognized that in this case, the weight
accorded to immigration status hinged on the outcome of the residence
determination.154 Specifically, the court noted that should it find the
grandmother to have parental responsibility for the children, it would be
extremely unlikely for Australian authorities to then refuse the children’s
141. Id. para. 80.
142. Id. paras. 85–86.
143. Id. para. 87.
144. Id. para. 94.
145. (1998) 24 Fam LR 178 ¶ 91 (Austl.).
146. Id. para. 7.2.
147. Id. paras. 7.4–.5. While the children were living in Australia, the grandmother’s
husband sexually abused one of the children. Id. para. 7.6. Interestingly, this abuse did not
impact the grandmother’s judgment that the children were better off in Australia and,
startlingly, does not appear to be addressed in the well-settled determination engaged in by
the court.
148. Id. paras. 7.7–.8.
149. Id.
150. Id. para. 7.8.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. Id. para. 74.
154. Id. para. 87.
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application to remain in Australia.155 The court reasoned, however, that if
it found that the children were not well-settled, it was likely that the
Australian authorities would deny a residency application and require the
children to leave the country.156
The court was disinclined, however, to consider the child’s future
prospects in its ultimate decision.157 Noting that future considerations
should have no bearing on the determination, the court concluded that there
is “no reason to find that the children will be required to leave Australia.”158
Therefore, the court found that the children were likely settled at the
relevant time.159
A well-settled analysis, as seen in the other cases discussed in Part II.B,
is usually singularly dispositive regarding the child’s ultimate living
situation. Thus, if a child is well-settled under Article 12, she is allowed to
remain in the country. On the other hand, if the child is not well-settled
under Article 12, absent another defense or the court’s invocation of its
Article 18 discretionary power, she is returned to her country of origin. In
Director General, the court hinged the well-settled analysis on the outcome
of a future residency determination. Therefore, though it appears the court
intended to adopt a view that immigration status should play a limited role
in the well-settled determination, it actually did just the opposite in granting
immigration status particularly significant weight in the ultimate
determination.160
These cases have a number of factors in common. First, each of the
district courts in the decisions discussed above considered immigration
status as a relevant factor in the well-settled determination.161 Second, each
of the courts (aside from Director General which, as discussed above, is a
unique case) found that the children were not well-settled.162 Third, all the
cases discussed above reflect a forward-thinking approach that considers
the child’s future prospects and how the threat of deportation or uncertain
immigration status may impact the child’s ability to flourish in a new
environment.163 The strongest common thread uniting these cases,
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. Id. paras. 91–92.
158. Id. para. 92.
159. See id. para. 93.
160. See id. para. 87.
161. See Lopez v. Alcala, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1260 (M.D. Fla. 2008); In re Ahumada
Cabrera, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2004); In re Koc, 181 F. Supp. 2d 136, 154
(E.D.N.Y. 2001).
162. See Lopez, 547 F. Supp. 2d at 1260; Ahumada Cabrera, 323. F. Supp. 2d at 1314–
15; Koc, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 154–55.
163. See Lopez, 547 F. Supp. 2d at 1260 (“[T]heir residence in this country is not stable
because neither [the mother] nor the children have legal alien status and, as such, are subject
to deportation at anytime.”); Ahumada Cabrera, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1314 (“[I]t is better for
the child to return to Argentina now than for her to be deported at a later date when she has
become firmly settled in the United States.”); Koc, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 154 (“The fact that the
Immigration Service may not be looking to deport them at this time does not, in any way,
guarantee that that position will not change in the future.”).

2013]

ACROSS THE BORDER AND BACK AGAIN

3711

however, is the significant weight accorded to immigration status in the
well-settled determination.
Though each of the courts considered
immigration status as one of a number of factors, they each ultimately
concluded that uncertain immigration status significantly outweighed other
mitigating factors.164 Such an interpretation is one approach that has
prevailed in the jurisprudence on this issue to date.
B. Immigration Status As an Equally Weighted Factor
The next group of cases treats immigration status as one of a number of
equally weighted factors in the well-settled determination. In these cases,
courts frequently find that though uncertain immigration status weighs
against a well-settled finding, the totality of factors indicating that the child
is well-settled may nonetheless allow for a well-settled finding. In other
instances, the court simply considers immigration status as one factor
among many weighing for or against a well-settled determination.
For example, in Giampaolo v. Erneta,165 a case from the Northern
District of Georgia, a mother and child, both habitually resident in
Argentina, fled to the United States.166 Eventually, the petitioner learned of
the mother and child’s whereabouts and filed an application for return of the
child with the Argentine Central Authority, but after the one-year period
had lapsed.167
Both the mother and child were in the United States illegally, although
the mother stated, in asserting the Article 12 defense, that she had recently
applied for citizenship.168 The court held that it was entitled to “consider
any relevant factor surrounding the child’s living arrangement.”169 In doing
so, the court considered the frequency with which the child and mother
were forced to move within the United States, that the mother lacked any
significant family support in the United States, and that the mother and
child lacked citizenship status.170 Additionally, the court considered that
the child had attended at least three different schools, that the child had
developed significant ties to Argentina, and that the mother and child were
currently living with the mother’s boyfriend—a convicted felon who had
previously been charged with violating Georgia’s Family Violence Act.171
These factors, when considered together, led to a finding that the child was
not well-settled in the United States and so the court ordered that the child
be returned to Argentina.172

164. Lopez, 547 F. Supp. 2d at 1260; Ahumada Cabrera, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1314; Koc,
181 F. Supp. 2d at 154.
165. 390 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
166. Id. at 1274.
167. Id. at 1274–75.
168. Id. at 1282.
169. Id. at 1281 (citing Ahumada Cabrera, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1313).
170. Id. at 1282.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1282–83.
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In Edoho v. Edoho,173 decided by the Southern District of Texas, the
court took the same approach—considering immigration status as one of a
number of equally weighted factors—and found that the children were wellsettled in their new environment.174 In Edoho, the mother and father were
married in Nigeria but eventually moved to the Bahamas, where the father
had citizenship.175 They had two children while living in the Bahamas, and
the mother eventually fled with both children to her sister’s house in
Houston, Texas.176 After some time, the father filed an application for
assistance with the U.S. Department of State, requesting access to his
children.177 In coordination with the Bahamian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
this request eventually morphed into an application for return of the
children under the Convention.178 In the meantime, the mother had married
a U.S. citizen and was in the process of applying for citizenship for both
herself and her children.179
The court, weighing a number of factors, found that the children were
now well-settled in the United States.180 Specifically, the court considered
the stability of their living situation, their success in school, and their
participation in various activities.181 Interestingly, despite noting the
uncertain immigration status of the mother and children earlier in the
opinion, the court did not specifically list immigration status as a factor
considered in its determination.182 This is due, perhaps, to the high
likelihood that both the mother and children would obtain citizenship
because the mother had married a U.S. citizen.183

173. No. H-10-1881, 2010 WL 3257480 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2010).
174. See id. at *7.
175. Id. at *1.
176. Id. The mother explained that she had fled the Bahamas because her husband had
been abusive to her and the children. Interestingly, she also alleged that one of her reasons
for fleeing was that, since her immigration status in the Bahamas was based on her nursing
job and her marriage, her husband had threatened to have her deported. Id. at *3.
177. Id. at *2. In fact, the father waited nearly two years to file the application, despite
having learned of the child’s whereabouts within one year of the abduction. Id. at *3. The
father explained that the delay was due to the great difficulty of finding a lawyer sufficiently
versed in the Convention to accept his case. Id. The court found this argument unavailing.
See id.
178. See id. at *2.
179. See id. at *4.
180. Id. at *7 (“And, the court finds that the children are ‘well-settled’ in their new
home.”).
181. Id. at *6–7. The court also conducted a fairly intensive tolling analysis in finding
that the father’s delay in filing his petition could not be equitably tolled. Id. *7 Though the
court did not explicitly state as much, it appears that the father’s lack of concern in obtaining
the immediate return of his children also factored into the court’s well-settled determination.
See id. (“[The mother] made no effort to conceal the children. While she did not inform [the
father] of her whereabouts, she went to live openly with a known relative, she did not change
her name or the children’s names, and she enrolled [one of the children] in school. . . . The
efforts [the father] did take to find them could not be described as determined or diligent. . . .
Additionally, the record reflects that his other efforts were equally desultory.”).
182. See id. at *6–7.
183. See id. at *4.
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In Demaj v. Sakaj,184 decided by the District of Connecticut, a mother
fled with her children from Italy to the United States.185 Nearly a year and
a half later, the left-behind father filed a petition for return of the children
pursuant to the Convention and ICARA.186 After filing the petition, the
father visited the children in the United States and, after publicly
threatening the mother, a warrant was issued for his arrest.187 Shortly
thereafter, the mother applied for a U-Visa, which provides temporary
immigration status to aliens who are victims of qualifying criminal
activity.188 According to the mother, she and the children were able to
obtain nonimmigrant status (specifically, legal permanent residence) in the
United States, and the mother was further able to secure social security
cards for herself and the children, employment authorization, and a
Connecticut driver’s license.189
Previously, the mother and father (who was temporarily living in the
United States during the course of the proceedings in this case) agreed that
all of the immigration documents belonging to the mother and children
would remain with the mother’s counsel until the conclusion of the
proceedings.190 The mother had accessed her passport in applying for the
U-Visa, and the father argued that this access was in violation of the parties’
previous agreement.191 Further, he contended that the mother’s subsequent
change in immigration status was directly relevant to her ability to establish
the well-settled defense.192
The court in Demaj was asked to decide a motion to compel production
of documents relevant to the ultimate well-settled determination, and did
not, therefore, decide the merits of whether the underlying defense was
warranted.193 It did, however, engage in an in-depth discussion of whether
immigration status is relevant to the well-settled determination.194 The
court conducted a broad survey of how U.S. courts have approached the
relevance of immigration status in determining whether a child is wellsettled.195 After considering cases like Ahumada, Koc, and Lozano v.
Alvarez196 (the district court opinion), the court concluded that “[i]n the
bulk of cases in which immigration status is considered [in a well-settled

184. No. 3:09 CV 255 (JGM), 2012 WL 476168 (D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2012).
185. See id. at *1.
186. See id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at *2.
189. Id.
190. Id. at *1.
191. See id. at *2.
192. See id.
193. See id. at *1.
194. See id. at *4–5.
195. See id. at *4 (listing cases).
196. In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d 197 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Lozano v.
Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-820 (U.S. Jan. 2,
2013); see also Part II.C.
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analysis] . . . it is considered as only one element among many.”197 The
court also noted that in cases where immigration status was not considered,
there was strong evidence of stability and numerous other factors weighing
in favor of a well-settled finding.198
The court granted particular deference to the district court’s decision in
Lozano, which held that immigration status should only be a significant
factor if there is an immediate and legitimate threat of deportation.199 Thus,
the court rejected the forward-looking approach embraced by other courts in
holding that, insofar as Article 12 is implicated, the Convention is
concerned with the present.200
Although they do not always come to the same conclusion, each of the
courts in this section considers immigration status as one of a number of
relatively equivalent factors in the well-settled determination.201 Even
where the court found a return warranted, immigration status was only one
of many factors weighing against a well-settled finding.202 This approach is
closer to the approach that circuit courts, to date, have found to be the most
appropriate: granting immigration status relatively little weight in the wellsettled determination.
C. Immigration Status Granted Considerably Less Weight
The last group of cases addressed by this Note exhibits the growing
tendency of courts to accord immigration status little, if any, weight in the
well-settled analysis. In each of these cases, the court embraced a forwardlooking approach in determining that the child was either unlikely to be
deported, or that the child’s prospects were not significantly negatively
impacted by an uncertain immigration status.203 To date, both the Second
and Ninth Circuits have considered the issue, with each finding that
immigration status should play a minimal role in the well-settled

197. Demaj, 2012 WL 476168, at *4.
198. See id. at *4 n.9. The court recently decided the merits of the case and reaffirmed its
earlier conclusion that immigration status is to be considered as one element among many in
the Article 12 determination. Demaj v. Sakaj, No. 3:09 CV 255 (JGM), 2013 WL 1131418,
at *23–24 (D. Conn. Mar. 18, 2013).
199. Demaj, 2012 WL 476168, at *4 (citing Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 232–33).
200. See id. The subsequent Demaj decision deviated slightly from this approach in light
of the Second Circuit’s decision in Lozano. Following the Second Circuit’s lead, the District
of Connecticut considered how immigration status was likely to affect the benefits available
to the children in the United States. See Demaj, 2013 WL 1131418, at *23.
201. See Demaj, 2012 WL 476168, at *4; Edoho v. Edoho, No. H-10-1881, 2010 WL
3257480, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2010) (listing immigration status as one of a number of
relevant factors in a “well-settled” determination); Giampaolo v. Erneta, 390 F. Supp. 2d
1269, 1281–82 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (same).
202. See, e.g., Demaj, 2012 WL 476168, at *4.
203. See, e.g., Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[W]hen making a now
settled determination, courts need not give controlling weight to a child’s immigration
status.”); In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 1010 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that uncertain
immigration status cannot undermine other considerations that weigh in favor of a “wellsettled” finding).
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determination.204 International courts have also followed suit,205 although
the reasoning embraced by each court differs on a case-by-case basis.
1. The Ninth Circuit
In re B. Del C.S.B. is perhaps the most significant Article 12 immigration
status decision to date and has formed the foundation for a host of district
court decisions throughout the country.206 B. Del C.S.B. involved a mother
and father who were both Mexican citizens.207 Neither had legal status in
the United States, despite efforts by the mother’s mother to gain such
status.208 During the duration of their relationship, the couple illegally
moved back and forth between the United States and Mexico numerous
times.209 Eventually, the mother, while living in Mexico, gave birth to a
daughter.210 During the next few years, both parents illegally traveled back
and forth between the United States and Mexico with their daughter in
tow.211
Eventually, the parents’ relationship soured, and the mother expressed a
desire to permanently immigrate (illegally) to the United States with the
daughter.212 The father agreed that the daughter could remain in the United
States with the mother subject to a number of conditions—including the
father being able to speak with the daughter on the telephone and to see her
during school holidays.213 After some time, the mother severed all contact
with the father.214 The father subsequently expended significant energy in
pursuing a host of legal remedies to reestablish contact with his daughter.215
Finally, the father was able to secure a meeting to initiate the Convention
process; yet, he was forced to wait an additional seven months while his
application was translated from Spanish to English.216 More than a year

204. See Lozano, 697 F.3d at 45; B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1010. Based on the greater
authority accorded to circuit court decisions, and their likely impact on an eventual United
States Supreme Court discussion of the issue, this Note discusses them below in significantly
greater detail than the district court cases cited in Parts II.A and II.B.
205. See, e.g., C (a Child), [2006] EWHC (Fam) 1229, [55]–[57] (Eng.) (holding that a
child is well-settled despite uncertain immigration status because the child is unlikely to be
deported).
206. See, e.g., Demaj, 2012 WL 476168, at *4; Edoho, 2010 WL 3257480, at *6.
207. B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1003.
208. Id. at 1003 n.4.
209. See id. at 1003.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 1004.
212. See id. at 1004–05.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 1005.
215. See id. at 1006. These efforts included visiting the Mexican Office of Family
Integration Services, and multiple trips to the Department of State for Protection of Minors.
In doing so, the father was forced, on numerous occasions, to sleep outside of the building.
See id.
216. Id. at 1006.
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after his last contact with his daughter, the father submitted his application
under the Convention to the Mexican Central Authority.217
After receiving the application, the Mexican Central Authority “advised
him not to take any further action, and to let the ‘long’ Convention process
run its course.”218 The Mexican Central Authority then transmitted the
father’s application to the U.S. Central Authority, which, in turn,
transmitted it to the NCMEC.219 The NCMEC then forwarded a copy of
the application to the Attorney General of California.220 Eventually, the
NCMEC was able to obtain an address for the daughter in California, and
the father subsequently filed his Convention petition in the Central District
of California.221
The district court granted the father’s petition based on, among other
factors, the child’s uncertain immigration status in the United States.222
Specifically, the court held that “[the mother] did not satisfy her burden of
proving an Article 12 defense because [the daughter’s] unlawful
immigration status precluded her from being settled in the United
States.”223
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding, holding that
uncertain immigration status does not undermine an otherwise well-settled
determination.224 The court noted that this particular question was one of
first impression: May a court find that a child is not “settled” for purposes
of Article 12 of the Convention because she does not have lawful
immigration status?225
The court, in addressing this question, engaged in an exhaustive analysis,
beginning with a consideration of whether any factors weighed in favor of a
well-settled finding.226 The court noted that the daughter had attended the
same school for multiple grades, had consistently recorded strong report
cards and attendance, was bilingual, and participated in multiple
Additionally, the child had resided in
extracurricular activities.227
California for some time, and her environment was otherwise relatively
stable.228
In determining how much weight to accord the mother and child’s
uncertain immigration status, the court began by consulting the

217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. It was believed, based on past information regarding the mother and daughter’s
whereabouts, that both mother and daughter were living in California. See id. at 1006–07.
221. Id.
222. See id. at 1007.
223. Id. This decision reflects the rationale embraced by the courts discussed in Part II.A,
wherein immigration status significantly undermined a well-settled finding.
224. See id. at 1015–16.
225. See id. at 1001–02.
226. Id. at 1009.
227. Id. at 1005–06.
228. Id.
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Convention’s text and history.229 The court considered the definition of
“habitual resident,” and determined that the term is to be interpreted
broadly, with even unlawful or precarious residence possessing the ability
to develop into habitual residence.230 The court applied the same reasoning
to the term “settled,” noting that, lacking an explicit definition, “settled”
may apply to a person who has been resident in a country for a significant
amount of time, notwithstanding an uncertain immigration status.231 Thus,
the court found that “[b]y acknowledging that an undocumented child may
be habitually resident . . . we have already accepted the principle that a
child may remain in a place in which he lacks legal status . . . because of his
close ties to that country.”232 Ultimately, the court concluded that
“[n]either text nor history suggests that lawful immigration status is a
prerequisite, or even a factor of great significance, for a finding that a child
is ‘settled’ in a new environment.”233
Next, the court turned to case law in an attempt to gauge the appropriate
role of immigration status in the well-settled determination.234 The court
reasoned that “prior district court cases that have concluded that an
undocumented child is not ‘settled’ have considered status as only one
element among many pointing to a lack of significant ties to the United
States.”235 In doing so, the court relied on the reasoning in C (a Child), a
case from the United Kingdom.236 In that case, a British court granted little
weight to the child’s uncertain immigration status in finding the child to be
otherwise well-settled.237 The sole countervailing factor against a finding
that the child was well-settled was the uncertain immigration status of the
mother and child.238 Following C (a Child), the Ninth Circuit held that the
child in the instant case “who has five years of stable residence in the
United States, coupled with academic and interpersonal success here, may
be ‘settled’ within the meaning of Article 12, despite her unlawful
status.”239 Her uncertain immigration status, therefore, was not enough to
overturn the determination that she was otherwise well-settled.240
229. See id. at 1010.
230. Id. at 1010–11.
231. Id. The court noted, for example, that an undocumented infant that “knows no other
home” is clearly settled in the new country, despite the infant’s lack of immigration status.
Id. at 1011.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1010.
234. See id. at 1010–11.
235. Id. at 1011.
236. Id. at 1012; see also infra notes 295–310 and accompanying text.
237. In justifying its reliance on C (a Child), the court noted that “in interpreting
international treaties, ‘the opinions of our sister signatories [are] entitled to considerable
weight.’” B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1012 (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404
(1985)).
238. See id. at 1011.
239. Id. at 1012. The court also cited Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), noting that
illegal entry into the country, does not, under traditional criteria, necessarily bar a person
from becoming domiciled in a particular state. B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1010–11.
240. See id. at 1015–16.
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The court then turned to a policy discussion to further cement its opinion
that immigration status has a negligible impact on the well-settled
determination.241 The court observed that many undocumented immigrants
permanently live in the United States and never encounter any issues with
the immigration authorities.242 These undocumented workers often obtain
regular employment, the court noted, and have successfully established
lives in the United States, irrespective of occasional heightened sensitivity
toward illegal immigration.243 Further, the court stated that these specific
parties were unlikely to be deported due to the large number of
undocumented immigrants living in the United States, and the general
preference for deporting illegal aliens with a criminal background.244
The court in B. Del C.S.B. also conducted a detailed analysis of how
immigration status might affect a child’s future prospects in California.245
The court examined the benefits and protections that undocumented
immigrants are frequently afforded under state and federal law.246
Specifically, the court cited a recent California federal case holding that the
state cannot deny public education to children based on immigration
status;247 the California Education Code, which permits undocumented
immigrants to pay in-state tuition fees at California universities and
community colleges;248 and a recent article noting that undocumented
immigrants are now eligible for Medicaid, school breakfast and lunch
programs, and nutritional programs in the United States.249
The court was careful, however, to measure these benefits and
protections against the potential future issues that could arise from a child’s
uncertain immigration status, including the inability to obtain a driver’s
license, restricted access to college financial aid, poor employment
prospects, and the general threat of deportation.250 Yet the court ultimately
concluded that the Convention is concerned with the present, and any
determination of future well-being is best left to the court conducting
custody proceedings.251
The court held, “We can see nothing in the Convention itself, in our case
law, or in the practical reality of living in this country without documented
241. Id. at 1012 (“Third, we conclude that, on a practical level, it makes little sense to
permit immigration status to serve as a determinative factor in the Article 12 ‘settled’
analysis.”).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See id. at 1012–13.
246. See id. at 1013.
247. See id. (citing League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244,
1255–56 (C.D. Cal. 1997)).
248. See id. (citing CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5(a)(4) (West 2002)).
249. See id. (citing TANYA BRODER, OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRANT ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL
PROGRAMS 4.3 (2007)). For an updated version of the report cited by the court, see TANYA
BRODER & JONATHAN BLAZER, OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRANT ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL
PROGRAMS (2011), available at http://www.nilc.org/overview-immeligfedprograms.html.
250. See id.
251. Id.
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status, to persuade us that immigration status should ordinarily play a
significant, let alone dispositive, role in the ‘settled’ inquiry.”252
Specifically, the court stated that the immigration status of the child and
mother are only relevant if there is an immediate, “concrete threat of
deportation.”253 The undocumented status of both mother and child cannot
undermine all the other considerations that weigh in favor of a well-settled
finding.254 The court summarized its holding as such:
Where, as here, a child has lived and thrived in her home and school for
over half of her life, and there is no reason to believe that she (or her
undocumented parent) will suffer any imminent, negative consequences
as a result of her unlawful status, it would be contrary to the Convention’s
purpose of keeping a child in “the family and social environment in which
its life has developed” to rely on immigration status as the basis for
rejecting an Article 12 defense.255

2. The Second Circuit
In Lozano, the Second Circuit followed suit in all respects except one key
aspect of the determination. Lozano concerned a mother and father, both
originally from Colombia, who entered into a relationship in 2004 while
they were living in London.256 Over the course of the relationship, Alvarez
made various allegations of abuse against Lozano.257 Though they never
married, the mother gave birth to a child in 2005, and the family lived
together until 2008.258 During that time, the child developed a host of
issues that may have been caused, to some degree, by the domestic disputes,
including extreme shyness and bed-wetting.259 One day, instead of taking
the child to nursery school, the mother fled with her daughter to a women’s
shelter, where the two lived for approximately seven months.260
Eventually, both mother and child fled to New York to live with the
mother’s sister.261
Since they had British passports, the mother and daughter were allowed
to enter the United States without a visa for up to ninety days.262 In the
months that followed, the child experienced dramatic behavioral
improvements, was quite successful in school, and made several friends.263
Meanwhile, the father had made a number of attempts to locate both the

252. Id. at 1010.
253. Id. at 1009.
254. Id. at 1010.
255. Id. at 1013.
256. Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, No. 12820 (U.S. Jan. 2, 2013).
257. Id.
258. See id. at 45–46.
259. Id. at 46.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See id.
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mother and daughter within the United Kingdom.264 Eventually, the father
filed an application for return of the child with the English and Welsh
Central Authority, which then forwarded it to the U.S. Department of State
Office of Children’s Issues.265 The father thereafter filed a petition for the
return of the child in the Southern District of New York.266
The district court held evidentiary hearings at which, among other things,
it heard expert testimony regarding the child’s various behavioral issues and
improvements since moving to the United States.267 The court first held
that the father had made out a prima facie case of wrongful retention by
establishing that (1) the child was a habitual resident in the United
Kingdom; (2) the mother’s wrongful removal breached the father’s custody
rights; and (3) the father was exercising those custody rights at the time the
child was abducted.268 The district court ultimately denied the application,
however, holding that the child was now well-settled in the United
States.269 In doing so, the court considered a number of factors, including
the duration of the child’s residence in the United States, her various social,
behavioral and academic improvements, and the child’s family situation in
New York.270 The court also considered the mother and child’s
immigration status—specifically, that both had overstayed their visas and
were residing in the United States illegally.271 The court explicitly rejected
the argument that immigration status precludes a well-settled finding as a
matter of law.272 Instead, the court adopted a forward-looking approach,
noting that there was little to suggest that the child’s immigration status

264. See id. at 47. The father contacted one of the mother’s other sisters residing in
London, who denied any knowledge of the mother’s whereabouts. Id. The father then filed
an application with a British court to obtain regular contact with the child. Id. He also
submitted orders to the mother’s relatives and former counsel, as well as a number of other
parties, including the child’s teachers and doctors, seeking information regarding the mother
and child’s whereabouts. See id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See id.
268. Id. at 47–48.
269. Id. at 48. The court also rejected the father’s argument that equitable tolling should
apply so as to render any affirmative defenses moot. Id. Specifically, the district court stated
that the
one-year period is not a statute of limitations and, therefore, it is not subject to
equitable tolling. A petitioner is not barred from bringing a petition after the oneyear period has lapsed; rather, after that point, a court must consider the
countervailing consideration that the child may now be better served remaining
where he or she is currently located.
In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d 197, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Lozano v. Alvarez,
697 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-820 (U.S. Jan. 2, 2013).
270. Lozano, 809 F Supp. 2d at 231, 234.
271. See id. at 233. The mother indicated during the hearing that she had spoken with
immigration authorities about the possibility of being sponsored by her sister. Lozano, 697
F.3d at 46.
272. See In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 232–33.
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would, now or in the future, significantly affect the stability of the child’s
life in New York.273
The father subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal274 and, prior to
oral argument, the Second Circuit requested that the U.S. Government
submit an amicus brief.275 Specifically, the court asked the government to
address the equitable tolling issue, as well as the proper degree of weight to
be accorded to immigration status when determining whether a child is
settled within the meaning of Article 12.276 The government thereafter
submitted a letter brief recommending that the court consider the child’s
immigration status as one factor in the court’s determination of whether the
child was now settled in her new environment.277 The government, in
arguing for a reduced role for immigration status in the determination,
relied on many of the cases discussed in this Note, including a number of
international decisions.278 The government did, however, advocate for a
forward-looking approach in determining how much weight should
ultimately be accorded to immigration status in the determination.279
In rendering its decision, the Second Circuit addressed two questions of
first impression: Should the one-year period be equitably tolled, and can a
child who lacks legal immigration status nevertheless be found to be wellsettled under Article 12.280 As to the latter issue, the court began its
analysis with the text of the Convention, noting the great degree of weight
accorded to the statutory language and legislative history.281 In considering
273. Id. at 233. The district court also considered whether it should exercise its
discretionary power, under Article 18, to order return of the child despite the existence of a
valid affirmative defense. See id. at 234–35. In declining to do so, the court focused on the
fact that the child had experienced dramatic social and behavioral improvement since
moving to the United States, and ordering a return of the child to the United Kingdom risked
exposing the child to additional trauma. Id. The court, in employing this reasoning,
essentially asserted a sua sponte “grave risk” affirmative defense. See supra note 68 and
accompanying text.
274. Lozano, 697 F.3d at 49.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Letter Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Lozano v. Alvarez, 697
F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 11-2224-cv). The government also recommended that the court
find that “[e]quitable tolling does not apply to the one-year period under Article 12; instead,
the court retains equitable discretion to order a child’s return at any time.” Id.
278. See id. at 13–15 (citing A. v. M. (2002), 209 N.S.R. 2d 248 (Can. N.S. C.A.); C (a
Child), [2006] EWHC (Fam) 1229 (Eng.)).
279. See id. (noting that each situation must be considered on a case-by-case basis and the
likelihood of deportation in the future may impact the “well-settled” determination). The
government also stated that “[t]he Convention’s overarching focus on a child’s well-being
suggests that this [well-settled] inquiry concerns a child’s practical circumstances.” Id.
280. Lozano, 697 F.3d at 45. On the tolling issue, the court considered the Convention’s
plain language, history, the government’s arguments in its amicus brief, and other relevant
circuit court decisions. The court concluded that the one-year period was not subject to
equitable tolling, and therefore the mother in Lozano was free to assert the Article 12
affirmative defense. See id. at 50–55.
281. Id. at 56–57. The court specifically stated, earlier in the decision, that any treaty
analysis begins with a close examination of the text and history of the treaty and that, while
general rules of statutory construction may be considered, the court must look to the history
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how to define “settled,” the court stated that, “[w]here a term is undefined
in a statute, ‘we normally construe it . . . with its ordinary or natural
meaning.’”282 In this case, the court determined that “settled,” as it is used
in the statute, suggests a “stable and permanent relocation of the child.”283
This term is informed by the statute as a whole; despite the Convention’s
goals to ensure a prompt return of the child, the drafters recognized that
there may come a point where returning the child to her habitual residence
would not be in the child’s best interests.284 Thus, the court concluded that
the child is settled where she has developed “significant emotional and
physical connections demonstrating security, stability, and permanence in
[her] new environment.”285
In making a well-settled determination, the court recognized (as have
many courts that have considered the issue) that it may consider any
potentially relevant factor, including a child’s immigration status.286 The
court, however, determined that the weight accorded to immigration status
will inevitably vary for a number of reasons, including the likelihood that
the child will be able to obtain legal resident status in the United States, the
child’s age, and the extent to which the child’s future prospects will be
impinged by her uncertain status.287 Yet the court ultimately recognized, in
endorsing the district court’s decision, that this uncertainty must be weighed
against a number of other factors suggesting the child is well-settled.288 In
doing so, the court concluded that courts need not give significant weight to
a child’s immigration status when making an Article 12 determination.289
On a case-by-case basis, the weight accorded to immigration status—
insofar as it relates to a child’s future prospects—will vary depending on,
for example, the likelihood of deportation or the existence of significant
barriers to the child’s obtaining government benefits.290 Yet the Second
Circuit, following the general reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in B. Del
of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the signatory parties
in determining the treaty’s meaning. Id. at 50.
282. Id. at 56 (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993)).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 56–57.
287. Id. at 57. Though the Second and Ninth Circuits ultimately reach the same
conclusion regarding the appropriate degree of weight accorded to immigration status in the
two cases addressed in this Note (Lozano and B. Del C.S.B.), they differ markedly in their
analysis of how future considerations impact the determination. While the Ninth Circuit
held that the Convention was only concerned with the present and not with the ultimate
impact a well-settled finding might have on a child’s future prospects, In re B. Del C.S.B.,
559 F.3d 999, 1013 (9th Cir. 2009), the Second Circuit recognized that the weight accorded
to immigration status will ultimately vary on a case-by-case basis depending on the
protections and detriments associated with uncertain immigration status. Lozano, 697 F.3d at
57.
288. Lozano, 697 F.3d at 58.
289. See id. at 45.
290. See id. at 57. The court noted, for example, that the importance of immigration
status will vary depending in part upon “the extent to which the child will be harmed by her
inability to receive certain government benefits.” Id.
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C.S.B., ultimately opted to adopt an approach in which immigration status is
accorded relatively minimal weight in the well-settled determination.291
The court declined, however, “to impose a categorical rule that the weight
to be given to a child’s immigration status var[y] only in accordance with
the threat of deportation.”292 The left-behind father has filed a petition for a
writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. 293 The Court has not yet addressed
the petition, but has requested that the Solicitor General provide advice in
the case. 294
3. The United Kingdom
International courts have adopted similar interpretations regarding the
role of immigration status in the well-settled determination. C (a Child),295
a British case, presents just such a scenario. In C (a Child), a mother and
daughter fled from the United States to England amidst allegations that the
father had sexually abused another one of his daughters.296 The mother had
recently remarried a man living in England.297 Shortly thereafter, the father
obtained a warrant for the mother’s arrest for violation of a contact order
between the father and daughter, and the U.S. court granted the father
custody of the child.298 Nearly five years later, the father was able to locate
the mother and child in England, and subsequently filed a petition for return
of the child.299 At the time, the child had been going to school in England
for a number of years and had many British friends.300 The mother and
daughter, however, were still residing in England illegally.301
In conducting a well-settled Article 12 analysis, the British High Court of
Justice, Family Division, considered a two-prong test with both physical
and emotional/psychological components.302 The court noted that, as to the
291. See id. at 58 (finding a child to be well-settled despite an uncertain immigration
status).
292. Id. at 58 n.18. The court stated that it declined to impose such a rule due to the
possibility that instances may arise where immigration status significantly impacts the
child’s future, despite the lack of a threat of deportation. See id.
293. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lozano v. Alvarez, No. 12-820 (U.S. Jan. 2, 2013).
294. Order Inviting the Solicitor General To File Brief As Amicus Curiae, Lozano, No.
12-820 (U.S. Mar. 18, 2013).
295. C (a Child), [2006] EWHC (Fam) 1229 (Eng.).
296. Id. at [1], [4]–[5].
297. Id. at [5].
298. Id. at [6]–[7].
299. See id. at [1]–[2]. All contact had been lost between the parties after the mother and
daughter fled to England. The father learned of the child’s whereabouts while conducting an
internet search and happening upon an article on school bullying in which the daughter was
cited as a victim. Id. at [2], [10].
300. Id. at [21].
301. Id. at [28]. Shortly after moving to England, the mother’s new husband, under the
guise of returning to the United States to fetch the mother’s remaining child, abandoned the
mother and daughter. Id. at [20]. The other daughter was able to eventually move to
England and, after living with the mother and daughter for some time, married and moved to
a house in the same town as the mother and daughter. Id.
302. Id. at [46]. (“The word ‘settled’ has two constituents. The first is more than mere
adjustment to new surroundings; it involves a physical element of relating to, being
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first prong, the child was indeed settled in England—she was wellintegrated into the community, had been living in the same place for some
time, and had made a number of permanent relationships.303 The court
recognized that the key question concerned the stability inherent in the
second prong: “So far as the future is concerned, the only question mark
hanging over the continued residence of [the daughter] and her mother
where they presently are, is their immigration status.”304 In evaluating how
much weight to accord immigration status, the court stated that there must
be a showing of stability into the future such that the child’s “position . . .
[is] as permanent as anything in life can be said to be permanent.”305
The court concluded that despite an ongoing risk of deportation, the
mother and daughter had been given no warning or notice that they were
likely to be deported.306 Additionally, the mother’s application for leave to
remain was still pending.307 The court noted that there was a strong
likelihood that the immigration authorities were aware of the mother and
daughter’s presence in England and had opted not to deport them.308
Therefore, the court reasoned, it was unlikely that deportation would occur
in the future, and thus the mother and daughter’s uncertain immigration
status should be granted minimal weight.309 The court ultimately found that
the child was well-settled in England and declined to issue a return order.310
The aforementioned cases each come to the conclusion that immigration
status should play a relatively minor role in the well-settled
determination.311 Whether based on close scrutiny of the Convention and
its history,312 decisions of other courts,313 or practical considerations,314 the
Second and Ninth Circuits and the British High Court of Justice, Family
Division, each recognized that, though the mother and child in each case
lacked legal immigration status, other factors dwarfed any concerns
regarding immigration uncertainty.315 Each found that there was relatively
established in, a community, and an environment. The second is an emotional and
psychological constituent denoting security and stability. It must be shown that the present
situation imports stability when looking into the future.”).
303. Id. at [54].
304. Id. at [56].
305. Id.
306. Id. at [57].
307. Id. at [56].
308. See id. at [57].
309. See id.
310. See id. at [59].
311. See Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[C]ourts need not give
controlling weight to a child’s immigration status.”); In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 1010
(9th Cir. 2009) (“We can see nothing . . . to persuade us that immigration status should
ordinarily play a significant, let alone dispositive, role in the ‘settled’ inquiry.”); C (a Child),
[2006] EWHC (Fam) [57] (finding that an uncertain immigration status was not significant
factor in a “well-settled” determination).
312. See Lozano, 697 F.3d at 56–57; B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1010–11.
313. See B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1011–12; C (a Child), [2006] EWHC (Fam) [56].
314. See B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1012.
315. See Lozano, 697 F.3d at 57; B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1009; C (a Child), [2006]
EWHC (Fam) [54]–[57].

2013]

ACROSS THE BORDER AND BACK AGAIN

3725

little evidence suggesting that the child faced a threat of deportation.316 In
addition, both the Second and Ninth Circuits suggested that the child’s
immigration status would likely have little effect on the child’s future
prospects—a forward-looking approach that was not preclusive of a wellsettled finding.317
III. FINDING A COMPROMISE: MANY OPINIONS,
TWO CIRCUITS, ONE APPROACH
Each of the approaches discussed in Part II—granting immigration status
considerable weight, relatively equal weight, or relatively little weight in
the well-settled determination—presents a compelling case for how
immigration status should be analyzed in an Article 12 case. Indeed, it
might seem logical that uncertain immigration status should virtually
preclude a well-settled determination, as the courts in Part II.A contend.
How can a child ever be truly settled if she faces at least a theoretical threat
of deportation? Yet the courts in Part II.C, after engaging in a detailed
analysis of the Convention’s history and purpose, case law, and practical
considerations, came to the opposite conclusion: immigration status should
play a relatively minor role in the determination, and likely will not (at least
in B. Del C.S.B. and Lozano) have significant effects on the child’s future
prospects.
It is clear that courts across the country—indeed, across the world—are
split on how to approach this nuanced and important issue. Part III
discusses a potential compromise, and advocates for a uniform approach to
the issue that ultimately accords immigration status relatively minor
consideration, but still retains a forward-looking evaluation of its impact on
the child’s future. Specifically, this approach would adopt the findings of
the Second and Ninth Circuits insofar as they advocate for relatively
minimal weight to be accorded to immigration status in an Article 12
determination. Yet, as the Second Circuit recognized in Lozano, the degree
to which immigration status should factor into the Article 12 analysis
ultimately hinges on the protections available, on a case-by-case basis, to
ensure that a child has the opportunity to fully prosper in a new
environment.
A. The First Prong: Immigration Status Should Be
Accorded Minimal Weight
The first rule embraced by this approach dictates that courts grant
immigration status minimal weight in the well-settled determination. The
Ninth Circuit, in particular, conducts an exhaustive analysis of why this
should be the case,318 and the Second Circuit essentially adopts such an
316. See Lozano, 697 F.3d at 58; B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1012; C (a Child), [2006]
EWHC (Fam) [57].
317. See Lozano, 697 F.3d at 57–58; B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1013.
318. See supra notes 229–55 and accompanying text.
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approach, but does so with more brevity.319 Beginning with the
Convention’s text and history, the Ninth Circuit makes the argument that
the Convention drafters did not intend for immigration status to play a
particularly significant role in the well-settled determination.320 Relying on
the ambiguity of the “settled” definition, as well as the Convention’s
overtones stressing the best interests of the child, both circuits determined
that a statutory analysis leads to a conclusion that immigration status should
be considered as at least an equally weighted factor, if not an insignificant
one.321
Perhaps one of the most compelling arguments for granting immigration
status little weight in the well-settled determination is that undocumented
immigrants, specifically those living peacefully in the United States, face a
relatively low risk of deportation.322 As the Ninth Circuit makes clear,
millions of undocumented immigrants live their entire lives in the United
States without ever encountering a problem with the immigration
authorities.323 The court in C (a Child) came to a similar conclusion (albeit
from a slightly different angle). Where the immigration authorities knew of
the parent and child’s illegal status and still opted not to take action, the
court was free to conclude that it was unlikely that the parent and child
would face deportation.324
Indeed, perhaps the strongest argument in favor of such an approach has
not been explicitly articulated by the courts discussed above, but is
essentially inherent in their discussion of the well-settled factors: that, at
the time of consideration, immigration status had not prevented the child
from developing significant connections and succeeding in a new
environment. Despite an uncertain immigration status, the daughter in B.
Del C.S.B. had attended the same school for multiple years, had consistently
strong report cards and regular attendance, and excelled in various
extracurricular activities.325 In Lozano, the child had made dramatic
behavioral advancements, made a number of new friends, and was doing
well in school.326 Even in those cases that ultimately grant immigration
status a dispositive role in the well-settled determination, courts do not
hesitate to describe the significant advances the children have made in their
new environment.327 Perhaps the best evidence that immigration status
should be granted minimal weight in the determination, therefore, is that it
has, in case after case, presented virtually no hindrance to the child’s ability
to excel in a new environment.328
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

See supra notes 281–91 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 229–33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 229–33, 281–91 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 241–44 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 241–44 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 307–10 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 227–28 and accompanying text.
See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra note 128 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra notes 181, 227–28, 263 and accompanying text.

2013]

ACROSS THE BORDER AND BACK AGAIN

3727

B. The Second Prong: A Forward-Looking, Case-by-Case Approach
Despite the various arguments discussed above, it is possible to imagine
a situation in which, though the child has suffered no ill effects to date
because of her uncertain immigration status and does not face any
immediate threat of deportation, the child is significantly disadvantaged in
the future because of her immigration status.329 Obviously, such a forwardlooking approach assumes a number of things—including, for example, that
the child is unable to obtain legal status in the interim. Consideration of
these potential disadvantages, however, is consistent with the Convention’s
goals of protecting the child’s best interests. Therefore, the second aspect
of the approach advocated in this Note mandates that courts generally
accord immigration status little weight, except where that uncertain
immigration status is likely to affect the child’s future prospects,
irrespective of a deportation risk.
The Ninth Circuit presented a logical template of how to conduct such an
analysis in B. Del C.S.B., where it specifically discussed how immigration
status may impact a child’s future prospects.330 The court noted that the
child faced significant barriers in obtaining a driver’s license and access to
It also considered, however, the various
college financial aid.331
protections implemented under state and federal law to allow
undocumented immigrants to flourish in the United States.332 Specifically,
the court noted California educational codes permitting undocumented
immigrants to pay reduced fees for state universities, and recent trends
across the country broadening access to Medicaid, state nutritional
programs, and subsidies for school lunches.333 The court ultimately
concluded, however, that the settled inquiry is purely concerned with the
present.334
Thus, though the Ninth Circuit recognized the potential value of
considering the child’s future prospects, it declined to ultimately consider
how they might be impacted by the child’s uncertain immigration status in
conducting a well-settled analysis. The Second Circuit, though highly
deferential to the Ninth Circuit’s findings, declined to adopt this particular
aspect of the Ninth Circuit decision and opted instead to suggest an
approach more in line with that suggested by this Note. The Second Circuit
asserted that the weight ascribed to a child’s immigration status will
necessarily vary on a case-by-case basis
because we can imagine instances where immigration status may be
important even if the threat of removal is negligible, we decline to impose

329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

See supra notes 250, 287 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 245–51 and accompanying text.
See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 246–49 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 246–49 and accompanying text.
See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
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a categorical rule that the weight to be given a child’s immigration status
varies only in accordance with the threat of deportation.335

The Second Circuit recognized that whether the child will be precluded
from receiving government benefits, for example, may weigh on the
immigration decision, despite a finding that the child was not facing a
significant deportation risk.336
As the U.S. government notes in its amicus brief in Lozano, “[t]he
Convention’s overarching focus on a child’s well-being suggests that this
[well-settled] inquiry concerns a child’s practical circumstances.”337 A
forward-looking approach that grants additional weight to immigration
status where it appears likely that it will significantly impact the child’s
ability to flourish in their new country is consistent with the purpose of the
Convention.
Thus, consider two scenarios under the approach proposed by this Note:
In the first, the child faces little deportation risk and state and federal
protections exist guaranteeing undocumented immigrants significant rights
to education, medical care, and the like. In the second, the child again faces
little deportation risk, but there are few, if any, state and federal protections
in place to protect the rights of undocumented immigrants. Therefore, in
the second scenario, it appears likely that the child will be unable to access
the same rights as those guaranteed to them in their country of origin.
Under the approach outlined in this Note, a court considering how
immigration status affects a well-settled determination would grant
immigration status significantly more weight in the second scenario.
Therefore, immigration status, by default, plays a relatively minimal role in
the Article 12 analysis, except where it is likely to affect the child’s future
prospects.
CONCLUSION
The role immigration status plays in the Article 12 determination
ultimately has a major and tangible effect on the life of the child in
question. The issue addressed by this Note is not a theoretical procedural
scenario or an arcane aspect of an obscure area of law, but a significant
debate with far-reaching consequences. Whether or not to order the return
of a child—where that could mean a return to a potentially abusive parent
or an unsettled environment—is no small charge. Yet for the most part,
courts have heeded the Convention’s purpose: protecting the best interests
of the child. The Supreme Court should grant certiorari to an Article 12
case to promulgate a bright-line rule, such as the one suggested by this
Note. Such a rule would preserve the Convention’s mandate by reflecting
335. Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 58 n.18 (2d Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, No.
12-820 (U.S. Jan. 2, 2013); see also supra note 292 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 286–92 and accompanying text.
337. Letter Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14, Lozano, 697 F.3d 41 (No.
11-2224-cv).
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an overarching concern for the child’s welfare, both at the time of the wellsettled determination and into the future.

